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The slow evolution of '' the new world order" after th t: collapse of 
communism and rhe lack of conscn'ins on new global relations have sent 
shuckwaves through international organizationl> and triggered off a cril-il> of 
multilateralism. However. that turmoil i<> not a consequence of a dimin-
ished neell for the expansion of international relaLinno;, rights and organi-
zations. On the contrary, the implosion of communism, the big Lhaw in 
inte rnational rela tions following the cold war, and the creation of numer-
ous new sta tes, intensified the need for the globalization of fundamen tal 
is.-.u ~.: · of security and tlt:velopment while the international interaction and 
interdependem:c broadened. The cold war bipolarity, in the course of 
which, acoording to the wonlJ. of American UN nmbassador Madaleine K 
Alhright, " the biggelit portion of what w~.: were for was dictated by what 
we were against", evaporated. ! 
I nt em a I iooal com rnuoity hlls increasi11gly, I ega lly and politically, been 
encroaching upon internal affairs of imliviclual states, particulllrly regarding 
ecology, common heritage of mankind, individual ami oollective rights. in-
ternal democratization, di.'armament, standardization, etc. 
1 From her speech at North Carolina State Univ.;n;ily, R;~leigh, 13 February 
19<15. 
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Nevertheless, the conceptua I sketchiness nf the reform of international 
relations and mechanisms, partic.ula rly that of the United Nations, is not 
the resul t of intellectua l blockades but of the lack of a global consensus 
and particularly of the agreement among the great powers as to what 
kind of a brave, new world we want. 
The crisis on the territory of the former Yugoslavia hroke out at a 
very inopportune moment in international relations, the fact which stood 
in the way of its solution; it was the p eriod when regional and global 
relations were thrown out of balance. following the unification of G ermany, 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the creation of new states as 
well as internal weaknesses and leadership crisis in major cen te rs nf world 
power. 
America feels uncomfortahlc in the new role of tl1e sole superpower. It 
does not want to be the wo rld policeman. It constantly bobs and weaves 
iT1 its regional focus of its foreign policy interest. With a weary eye it 
wa tches the political and economic upheavals in Russia. It is torn between 
geopolitics and geoeconomics, rights and interests, principles and pragma-
tism. 
Russia today - traditionally torn between modernism and traditional-
ism, EurophiJia and Asia tism, op enness and autarchy, democratization and 
despotism, the individmtl and t·he collective - is more than ever internally 
divided in the search of its identity and dignity. 
Chin a - striding with giant leaps of economic growth - has been 
rapidly destroying its resources. By freezing the political while speeding up 
the economic reform, this vast country has been building up the tension 
nf future political tectonics. 
Japan has been looking for a more respectable international role which 
would correspond to its level of self-confidence ~111d power, but at the 
same time uses a llonhle s tandard in defending its narrow inte rests, par-
ticula rly economic ones. 
The countries of the European Uninn have heen vacillating between 
the priority of the in-depth integration and the geographical expansion. 
The cold-war concepts of the European regional security have proved to-
tally inatlequa te in lhe face of lhe humanitarian and security disasters that 
have shredded the European fabric. European rivalries and fickle alliances 
have been rekindled. The attitude towanJs Russia is increasingly ambiva-
lent. 
The problems of underdevelopment, the destruction of basic resnun:es 
and the population boom in the tleveloping countries plus the growing 
contrasts benveen the world's North and South have been completely 
pushed back. An entire continent, Africa, seems to have bteu \dt out in 
the cold. 1\.s the reaction to similar developments in the developed world, 
civiJisational-n::ligio us blocs have bee n emerging in o ther regions. 
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Despite aU the menlionet.l cunlrudictions there is a general consent 
about the ncct.l to reform the system of intemalional relations and their 
mcchani ms by means of democratizatio n ant.l debureaucratization, the af-
firmation of international law, the prevention of blockades, the restriction 
of thc usc of vetoes, bigger efficacy and expertise, informa lities, streamlin-
ing protocol, etc. However, the approaches to the methods and the pri-
orities in achieving these aims have remained inherently different since 
each reform of the international rela tions requires a thorough redistnbu-
tion of power, new anti mnre realistic distribution of privilege ami duties 
within the developed as well as between the tlcvcloped and the underde-
velopment world. 
The need for a more efficient., cheaper and lc!..' uhSL"Urt! functioning of 
the United Nations has mised the quco;lion of the distribution of power 
in the world organization a" weU. 
Tin~ re form of the Secu rity Council strives al increasing the number of 
permanent members 0 1· at intTtHJucing semi-permanent members, bt::ltl!r 
regional represcutalion, p-.rticularly of the Third World, the aholition or 
the re!>triclion of the right of veto. higher vi.,ibiliry of its operation, a 
change in funding peacemakrn~ operations and so on. The changcl\ in the 
UN Charter, the Codex and the role of the Gcncml Assembly have been 
01lled for as welJ as greater powcT'I for ECOSOC within ill domain, 
comparable to the latitude that the ecurity Council enjoys in the field of 
international '\ecurity. 
The role of the UN Secretarial and Secretary-General is to he rede-
fined. Bette t coordination among UN agencies shou ld he achieved, and 
wasteful duplie<1tion of activities of num erous agencies within the UN 
should be avoided. Apart from the democratization of inlcm a lional rela-
tions, a greater " depolitization" of commou in tcre~<1 issues has been called 
fo r. 
The expansion of L11c peacekeeping operations wa.s the re ult of the 
fact that the great powers at long last 'howed readiness to cooperate in 
the Security CounciL A comparison of the 199-l dynamio. wilb that of 
1988 shows a drastic mcrease of peacekc:epmg operations: 78 Security 
Cnuncil Resolutions versus JS; 28 t.lunflicts with the UN as mcdiaLor ver-
us 11; 17 peacekeeping opcr.ttions versus 3; 7 sanction regimes versus 1; 
monitoring the elcclorr~l process in 21 cow1lries versus 0; 76 countries 
providing lhe troops versus 26; a hudget of 3.610 million dollars versus 
230 mi.Jiion; 73.395 blue llclmc l.s versus 9.570; and so on.2 
2 Source: Dun and Bralblrccl Economic Analysis Dep1U1.1IleoL publi:.bcd in 
Tht: New York I inte.t_ 
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According to Brian Urquhard'· peacemaking began a an improvisation 
in solving the problems of Kashmir and Palestine. obody ever thought it 
could become a therapy for intemationaJ or internal conflicts. During the 
cold war, peacemaking atrophied uuo an insmuneol of preventing Lhe es-
calauon of local conflict-. into a cla h of the great powers and blocs. 
The process of a Lhorougb recon ·tmction or inh:matiooaJ relations, 
particularly or the United Nations, will probably take yea~"'> a11d be a 
painstaking process, further ·lowed c..luwn by dilly-dallying in deciding on 
rhe c..lir\.!ctions the reform should take. It is more probable that the exist-
ing practices will be leg;sli;cd than a consent about the character and the 
mechanisms of the new international order achieved. 
In such international circumstances it was unrealistic to expect a reso-
lute response of the international community to Lhe crisis on the territory 
of the fum1er Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, it might be said - if we are to 
compare the efficacy of the UN in solving o ther regional crises at the 
time of bipolnri ty - that there was a willint,'llc."s fnr a strong presence of 
<~ II rckvunl global and regionnl organizations in this trouhle..,pol, though 
not always with pun~si of motive . The disappointment which many coun-
tries, including Croatia, have expressed in connection with the indecisive 
role of the UN, cao partly be attributed to the unwarranted notion that 
the U is the absolute gmmmtor ur peace, which it never has been nor 
t:<.lll be. 
The mediation of the UN and other regional organiz.ations on the ter-
ritory of the former Yugoslavia has brought to lhe fore all the weak:-
ne~'>es nr the undefined international system in transitiOn, panicuJarly of 
the slavery to the rraditionaJ, .. m:utrar' concept of peacekeeping. UN-
PROFOR in Croatia and Bo nia was given an ab urd ta~k of keeping 
peace \\here Lhcre. wru none, \\hile the international community threatened 
to use force without intending tn fulfill the promi-;c. Mort: than in other 
troublespots in the world, UN PROFOR also served a" the in~trument of 
fo reibrn pnlity of many countries who had sent their peacekeeping troops. 
On the other hand, the experience gained on the territory of the for-
mer Yugoslavia has Jed to certain innovations and determined the shape 
of all future peacemaking cffnrts of iotemational organizations. For exam-
ple, although NATO's involvement on the territory of the furrncr Yugo-
slavia has been tim.ited, it nevertheless has been the fi.rst time it was put 
to a military use outside its domain with the permission of the Secutity 
Council, under the "dual-key" comm and. The first two things will prohably 
have a positivt:: effect on the future concept of European coUective secu-
rity and the expansion of NATO, while the "dual key" command has 
3 From 1974 to 1986 llnrlersccrctary General for pulilk·al issues and one of 
rhe :uchnects of the pcac-.:kC4:piJl2 operations. 
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proved destructive for the credibility of Lhe mol>l ptlwcrful military alliance 
in hi. tory. 
Another characteristic of the pecific approach to thi~ cri.-.i!> il. the un-
prcceuentet.l concurrence tlf diplomatic and military activity o f major inter-
nauonal organizations (UN, EU, NATO. WEU, OSCE, OIC, and so on) 
and their cooperation with humanitarian and hnmnni lie campaigns of 
o;pecializc:d organizations. ever w the history of diplomacy have the po-
litical effons been combined with economic pressurcl> ami iM1latiun. Al-
though compreucnsive, Ul t.:l-e mcH'lurcs have been uperficial, designed to 
avoid a military intervention, because of Lhe unforseeable escalation due 
to the newly created power vacuum on European soil, the hahmce of in-
terest~ of globa l powers and a conceptual crisis of international relations. 
Thus the interest of Western countries in Bosnia and Cr(la t iH ha · been 
Jirc.:ctcu to four objectives: 
a) to prevent an out-of-hand large-sca le humanitarian catastrophe by 
solving the urgent problems 1i 1 situ (loca lization of the refugee crisis); 
b) to prevent the conflict to spill into other Balkan and European re-
gions (localization of the war); 
c) to create Lhe condition fo r a long-term solution of the conflict 
without a military intervention (crisis management); 
d) to prevent sour nott.:l> in the relations among the great powers and 
the negative effects on broader European and global conccpll of the 
emergmg collective security (reflections nn the new world order). 
Shru hi Tharonr' defined tbe conceptuaJ limitations of 
peacekeeping: "The world says: do not just stand iilly by, do 





Marrack Gouldinf advocated even more openly the ·tatic and neutral 
peacekeeping on Lhe tc::rritory uf the former Yugoslavia.7 Goulding made a 
clear dis I inclion between the traditiona l peacekeeping whos«.: aim is to 
freeze contlicts and the deterrent tliplomacy and the creation (even 
enforcing) peace. He said lhHI the recent repons about the involvement 
nf tht:: Yugoslav and the Croatian governments i11 Bo~'Tlia :-mel H erzegovina 
would not change the UN St.:~.;n: lariat's view on the situation, which is: 
tbi!l is an internal conflict with foreign powers' involvement. Whether the 
4 UN As~isHlnt Undersecretary for peacekeeping opcraltons, respon. ihle for 
UNPROFOR. 
\ NY/ Magazi11P, January 2, 1994. 
6 Undersecretary for peacekeepi.o,11, ope1 a 1jon 1o until l993. 
AI 1he .. round table" in New York, 31 January 1994. 
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UN is to change this approach to the cri:·ds depcmb; on the Security 
CounciJ.8 
AJthough Goulding voiced support fur 1 he peaceket!ping operation in 
Croatia, where an agr·eement between the warring sides on the cessation 
of 1he hostilities anti political negotiations was signed (the Vance plan), 
he recommended to the Security Council not to extend UNPROFOR to 
Bnsnia-HercegoviLla, where there was no agreement of this kind nor peace 
which should be kept. Beside:-;, in Bosnia-Hercegovina peacekeeping has 
gone hand in hand with the delivery of humanitarian aid, the limited 
NATO activity (in controll ing the no-fly zone, protecting UNPROFOR 
troops and the safe areas), and the presence of regional military and civil 
monitors. 
Goulding set forth five stages in shilping lhc UN's uclt!rring and me-
diatOLy peacekeeping role in crises: gathering information, political analysis, 
recommendation hy Secretary-General, intergovernmental approval, recom-
mendations and implementation of the approved policies. 
In a word, the UN do not consider themselves obliged and responsible 
for taking part in the solution of every lot:al, n:gional or global crisis. Po-
litic.al decisions should be made as to where the UN is to get involved. 
1\. muJtilateral consensus in line with the political and other interests of 
various state:; should ht: achicvcU, particuhnly of ~,>real powers. The UN 
involvement in a crisis should not follow the automatism of international 
Jaw, the extent of the humanitarian tragedy or the crisis' media coverage. 
UN Secretary-General doggedly claimed that it is not the UN respon-
sibility to protect the integrity of Bosnia or any other state, and least of 
all the concept of a mul tie1bnic society, if that is not approved by 
member countries. 
UN Secretary-General described the war in the former Yugoslavia as 
an internal conflict. Following an increHsing US involvement in the resolu-
tion of the crisis, Ghali vociferously opposed any large-scale activities 
against Bosnian Serbs, hiding beh ind neutrality and the safety of the de-
ployed peacekeeping forces. In his well-publicized letter to NATO Secre-
tary General of March 1994, he proposed that Ni\ TO took over from 
UNPROFOR, probably knowing that it would he extremely h;-ml to reat:h 
a consensus o n this, but deflecting criticism about the dual-key command 
and the intermingled UNPROFOR and NATO activities. 
The UN Secretariat, and particularly the Security Council, avoided to 
acknowledge that the root of the crisis on the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia was Serbi<rn ag&'Tt:ssion on CTilatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, 
since the concomitant UN responsibilities and the policies of the great 
powers towards that crisis would have to change radically and run counter 
8 IPA Roundtable Series, February 1994. 
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to the earlier resolutions of the Seeurity Council (arms embargo, for ex-
ample). 
Despite the unwillingness to Jcfinc the conflict on the te rritory of tlu: 
former Yugoslavia as an <1ct o f aggression on a soverdgn U member 
country, the Croatian diplomacy managcc.J Lu ·ecure such a s ta tement from 
the General Assembly. Umlt!r the item on the agenda 'The -.ituation on 
the occupied territorie~ of the Republic of Cmath···. in November of 1994, 
the General Assembly. \\ritb 1~2 vole for and none against, passcJ a 
resolu tion tlenowtcing Belgrade as a de facto occupying fnrcc of parts of 
Cro»tia . The prospect of branding "SRY" a de facto aggressor had been 
bandied about beforc in the General Assembly but due to the ferocious 
fighting between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Hcn.:egovina, Croatia migbt 
have a lso been branded as such. That is why such a diplomatic move 
cou ld be met with -.ucce.;s only after the Washington agreements. 
Aware nf these obstacles and searching fur a way to force the 
peacekeeping forces to fulfill their obligations envisioned by the Vance 
plan and later U resolutions by using force, Croatia a ttempted every-
thing, even the separa tion of the UNPROFOR mandate for the thre~ 
new countries in which UNPROFOR forces had bee deployt:tl, 1-;nce they 
had odgjnally hcen deployed in Croatia. In this Crofltia me t with o nly a 
partifll success (a symbolic separation ur commands was effectuated), tic-
spite the differences in the tasks in these three states (~,;n~uring a s ta le-
mate, supporting humanitarian operations. de terren t deployment). 
Americans were interesLctl in the separation of the mandates in order 
not to get invotvctl into a conflict in Macedonia (if it breaks out) where 
the USA had sent a deterrent contingl.!nt of soldiers. 
However, the European powers were not in favour of the separation 
of th~ mandfltes since this would give the local governments greall;r 
autonomy in solving the crisi.. The Secretari~1t justit:ied this by hllrping 
about the financial cost of tbe separation and the logistic anti operational 
reason fur the sta tus quo. 
The Croatian diplomacy, hy pushing the Resolutions R7 1 ;md 970 in 
the Security Council, later opted for the opposite approach: the linking of 
the sam:tion'> and the normalization of the international position of SRY 
not only with the resolution on the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina but in 
Croatia as well. The constant p ressure crt:fttcd politically fovourabJe conui-
tinns for sendil1g back home the ineffective UN peacekeeping forces i.n 
Croatia. 
By tc rmrnating the UNPROFOR manJnte, Croatia got itself expo1-cd to 
politkaJ (though not !ega]) criticism that it had renouncetl Lh~ Vance plan 
on basis of which the Security CounciJ approved the UNPROFOR man-
dale in 1992. However, the origina\ Vanc-e plan was later •·amended" by 
later Security Council resolutions, particularly Resolutions 815, 871 and 
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820, which defined the political solution for Croatia (integrity + auton-
omy). Moreover, Zagreb and Knin accepted several agreements such as 
the Erdut agreement, the Zagreb agreement and the Economic agreement , 
which entirely or pattly ran counter to the Vance plan. However, at the 
time when it accepted the Vm.1ce plan, Croat·ia was not a UN member. 
Moreover, peace plans are not a purpose in themselves, so Croatia based 
its decision not only on the right to sovereignty but also on the fact that 
the central precepts of the plan had not been implemented (guarding 
borders, reinstntement of the Croatian government, disarming paramilitary 
troops, return of the refugt.:es) ami that Scrbs had ueen refusing even to 
talk about the political solution. 
Early i11 SeptembeT of 1993, America announced a serious possibility 
that NATO was to take up the responsibility for e nforcing the UNPRO-
FOR mandate in Croatia as well, by splitting it into tbe military sector 
hcat.lcd by NATO (ct::ase-fires, separation of forces, removing landmines, 
control of the "blue thoroughfares") wbjle UNPROFOR would bold on to 
the civilian sector (humanitarian aid, civil police, monitoring local and 
general elections, confidence-huilding measures, rebuilding infrastructure <~.nd 
institutions, etc.). Under such circumstances NATO could not risk credibil-
ity and fail tJ1e tesl of iLs capability lo transform from a system of col-
lective defense into a system of eoUective security. n would also prove 
that NATO was capable of accepting the responsibility for the future se-
curity aml stability in Lhc region . It was a slcp in lht:: direction of NATO 
turning into an instrument of a broader collective security in Europe and 
a guarantor of stability in the Balkans and a form of an 
"extrainstitutional " cooperation between Croatia and NATO as a transi-
tional stage towards the fuli membership. 
Tn Lhe former Yugoslavia a most rcmarkahle shift from the cessation 
of hostiliti~s (separation, stalemate, creating conditions for negotiations) 
towards a pattial peace enforcement, the merging of humanitarian and 
politic<~l operations and deterrent diplomacy has been effeetuated. Such a 
shift could not have gone unnoticed by great powers and left no trace on 
their attitude towards the reform of peacekeeping forces. 
Although in Croatia, and particularly in Bosnia, tbe humanitarian and 
the peace.keeping mission of the international community have actively 
merged, this has proved counterproductive sincc the success of a humani-
tarian operation requires neutrality while enforcing the peac.e requires e.s-
tablishing who the aggressor is, otherwise there is no solution or it is 
postpont!d and unnecessarily complicated with no end in sight. Apart from 
delivering supplies to the aggressor as well, tbis combination of the tradi-
tional mandate and a humanitarian mission obstructs the military option 
(from the inside and the outside). This prolongs the conflict since soldiers, 
and not civilians, mostly profit from humanitarian aid. 
Despite this, the UN Secretariat, primarily iuterested in implementing 
Agenda for Peace of the Secretary-General, opposed the redefinition of 
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the concept of peacekeeping operations in Yugoslavia, s hunning the new 
and inl:rca!\;ngly difficult ta ... k.. fur which rt wao; underfinanced and under-
taffed. Thus they returned to the already tested models of maintaining a 
stalemate. Despite the fact that Boutros Boutros GhaJi WTOLC m the 'Ulme 
document that '· though the S) tem of states remains grounded in the in-
ternational community, the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty is 
over". 
In that letter Secretary-General came om with a va luable innovation in 
peace-building which in ethnic and civil oonnict'\ includes disarming the 
warring panies, the return of the refugees, police training, the protection 
of human rights, reforming or fortifying govemm~nt in~titulionl<, the pro-
motion of fnm1al and informal [Xllitical participation, renewing and 
'\trengtheniog mutuaJ trustY 
The confrontation between the NATO military structures and Lhe UN 
about the " dual-key" command and the need for unannounced and de-
termined reprisals by NATO's air force iJ1 Bosnia on severa l occasions 
ended in a hnltl1earted compromise. In l1is Jetter to the Security Cmtocil 
Chair.YomHn MHdaleine K. Albright of 1 November 1994, the UN Under-
secretary Chinmay R. GharekJlan tries to minimize thc~e uiffcrenccs ttnd 
empha ize the compromises achieved in the negotiations. proposes several 
potential targets for ATO air strikes and requires a prior warning to lhc 
party that is going to be a ttacked. But the shorte r procedure and the 
relative unpredictability of NATO's restricted air reprisals made it less 
probable rhat the U field commanders wouJd ask fo r them. 
Boutros Boutros Ghali made a peN.mal contribution to this debate.lO 
hy pointing out to the ever increasing responsibilities and the budget of 
the peacekeeping forces and the need for a broader coordination. Though 
he hailed tJ1e mor~ active p»rticiptttion of regional organizations, Ghali 
ncvcrthclc-.._ thought they should be put under tbe UN command (the 
demand which has been behind the conflict with the USA about the re-
form of peacekeeping for~!\) <~nd warned of the danger of ··regional he-
gemony <tnd interventionism''. ln Bosnian context, the St:crctary-Generttl 
obviously referred to NATO and not Lo the RtL·sian interventionist esca-
pades in "contiguow foreign countries" which the world si lently condoned 
a." pcttcckeepiog operations. 
1\Jthough in that article Ghali mentions that the circumstances in which 
peacekeeping operations (each of them specific) are taking plact: have 
changed (which include determent, supervision nf the distribution of hu-
manitarian aid and tJ1e restoration of the government and the infrastruc-
" Josef V. Montville, "Fa.:iu~ Ethnic Conflict: A l'roblero- olviog Diplomacy 
for the Clinton Administration", 17u: Han•ord Juumul of World Affairt, Spring 
1993 
10 ln his article in Tire New York Times of 30 Augu<:t 199·1 
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h1re in the states without an operating government and even a certain in-
volvement in internal conflicts), Secretary-General defines this as a transi-
tional anomaly anu advncaLes a partial reform of the traditional concept 
of peacemaking mediation but also the centralization of decision-making. 
Accnn.ling Lo The Wushington Post nf 2 Novemhcr 1994, "NATO's in-
tervention in 13osnia did not depend so lely on the general mandate of the 
UN Security Council but also on a special authority of Secretary-General, 
who delegl'lted this authority to his on-site representative. In short, NATO 
authorized an organizntion unwilling to use force to control its ability to 
use force." As a result, both organizations lost credibility and NATO, 
which is still in search of its role within the new system of European se-
curity, was turned into a "paper tiger". Such a situation does not only 
reflect profound differences in lhe character and the a ttitudes of these 
two organizations but a lack of political consensus among the countries 
which sit both in NATO and the Security Council and which use every 
oppor11mity to hide behind the UN anthority. 
The dual-key comm<llld had given a Jot of headache to militaLy plan-
ners and had mfldc a dent in NATO's cohesion. At the meeting of 
NATO's defense ministers in Mi.inchen in Februaty of 1995 it was clearly 
stated that this harmful practice had to be given up, regardless of its 
temporary necessity due to the cbH racter of the mandate or NATO's un-
prepare.dness to se.nd ground troops from national UNPROFOR contin-
gents made up of the soldiers from NATO mcmhcr-counLrics aml soldiers 
from other countries. 
A few days (on 29 April 1994) before Clinton's platform about the 
American stanJ on peacekeeping operations and particularly the criteria of 
American involvement, funding and logistic support were announced, the 
Security Council published a presidential report on peacekeeping operalions 
which rclicu heavily nn Secretary-General's report on " increasing the UN 
capacities for peacekeeping operations" of 14 March 1994 (~/26450), ad-
dressed to the General Assembly. The report emphasizes the "necu for 
clear find precise definition of tbe political objectives, of the mandates, of 
the costs wherever possible, of the time alloca.ted for peacekeepi11g opera-
tions and the neeu for Llll.:: mandates of the peacekeeping operations to 
be p eriodica lly subjected to a review". 
Here are some of the c1iteria for the approbation of new peacekeeping 
operations: a threat to the int.emlltional peace, the readiness of regional 
organizations to offer help in the resolution of the crisis; a stable cease-
fire and the. readiness of the warring parties to arrive at a politicfll solu-
Linn; <t clearly defined political objective; a possibility of formulating a 
well-thought out mandate of peacekeeping operation; safety of UN per-
soruJel. Without a desire ln Llclvc further into the e laboration of the 
mechanisms of enforcing peace where nece~sary, the concept is still based 
on a "full cooperation of the warring parties". 
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Some of the mentioned ''practicalities" are: the quality and the speed 
of the infumuttirm flow necessary for passing Security Council's decisions, 
a better communk.ation among the Council's memhers ami nunmcmlH!rS 
and monthly consu ltations between the Council's president and a compe-
tent group of cmmlries, as well as between the Council and the countries 
whose troops take part in the peacekeeping operations. For the,-;e coun-
tries the report envisions the necessity of tbe need for consultations each 
time an expansion or <I change of the mamlatc is considered, but does 
not stress the need for the consultations with the governments on whose 
territory peacekeeping forces are operating. 
Tllis platform of the Security Council also emphasizes the importance 
of a rapid deployment mH.I an increase i11 the number of peacekeeping 
fo rces for the success of the operation. Obviously giving up on the con-
cept of permanent UN forces (opposed by the USA), the Council instead 
advocates the formation of stantl-hy force:-; in member-countries which can 
be rapidly put at the disposal of the Security CounciJ and deployed in 
Lroublespots, their timely preparation as well as the grooming of civil and 
police forces. Although it is pointed out that tht; UN peacekeeping op-
erations have to be under the UN command, the General Assembly's de-
mand for Lhe solution of the problem of more efficient command and 
control was favourably received. 
On 22 February 1995 the Security Council reacted with a presidential 
report to the supplement to the earlier UN Secretary-General document 
(Supplement to Lbe Agenda for peace S/1995/1) in which he has partly 
revised or amended his earlier proposals. The Council agrees that the pri-
ority should be given to the prevention of conflicts; it upholds the impor-
tance of economic and social development i.n ensuring peace; it advocates 
the building Of peace after the Ct:SSalion Of hostilities; it n::itcratt:S the 
problem of the Jack of resources and troops; it proposes a more extensive 
training, equipping and pJanning of national contingents for peacekeeping 
operations; it emphasizes tbe importance of rapid deployment; demands 
more efficient information; requires a better coordination among the UN 
and other agencies; supports "microdisarmament" and the existing regimes 
of arms embargo; supports sanctions; emphasizes a greater role of regional 
organizations in the prevention of conflicts, creation and maintaining 
peace. 
The choice between morality and Realpolitik has never been an issue 
for the UN. Neither the Secretmy-General nor tbe Secretatiat have the 
mandate, let alone the ambition, to uperalt; in accordance with the lofty 
and abstract moral pdnciples. Nor is the UN a supranational organization 
wh ich acts in the name of the people and not the governments. Nor do 
member-countries, and particularly the b,rrcal powers, view the UN as 
something more than a thrashing ground of Realpolitik, a stock exchange 
of national interests, a st e~ge on which "dt;a]s an: struck" and "strength 
taken measure of'' . 
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Nation-state, its interests, sovereignty ancl integrity have re mained the 
central e<llc&rr'ry of U operation e'·en after the cold war. Boutros 
Uoutros Ghali likes to point out that he ~ ju_-.t a '"humble clerk" who 
carries out the will uf member coumries, which set him tasks and give or 
deny the resources for its Implementation. To undermine that principle 
would mean to undenninc the U themselves_ Or more precisely, the UN 
i" orten only the place and the mechanism through which the great pow-
ers impose their wilL 
The incapability of the U to renounce the cold war concept of peace 
mediation is not only a consequence of the cold war inertia of the UN 
Department for Peacekeeping Opcnttiun:. bn1 al ·o of the reluctance and 
the inHhility of the international system to deal with the causes of crises 
since they directly encroach upon the fow1dalions on which the interna-
tional :.ystem and thus the UN themselves rest: inviolable sovereignty, 
great powers' domination, no n-interference into internal affairs of member 
countries, respecting national inlcrcsls of member countries, e tc. 
Thus the UN have become the "junkyard" fo r those problems which 
the great powers do not wont to solve or i.Jecausc of whose S<.llntion they 
do not want to dash tlirectly. Owing to the recent policy of c{)nsensual 
multilatcrali -m of the great powers the UN peacekeeping operations have 
been used for rela tively rapid resolution. of t.Tiscs which u ed to be re-
solved within the framework of the cold war bipolarity. 
The Russian Federation has used the aclvncat.y uf peace mediation 
primarily as the justification for it · ov.'D ··policing'" in '·contiguous foreign 
U,IIIOI ries". 
For the USA, the "aggrc. :-.iv~ multilateralism~ was supposed to put the 
brake:: nn AmcriC~o neoisolauonism and alleviate the ri k!. of being the 
sole superpower and the world policeman_ Fur Wa bington, this new 
multilateratism shouJd have h~cn H cover for interventionism in those 
countries where an open defense of American national intl!n:sll. might he 
cundemned as a bla tant demonstration of force (the Gulf, Haiti). 
1\Jthough the great powt:r:. in princjpJe support tbe new, more con-
structive apprnach to the creation of peace, the refo rm has heen slowed 
down by the question of the command tWt:r peacekeeping troops, particu-
larly because of tbe powerful American reserves. Ame ricans have wavered 
in their <~pproach to the new concept of pea~.:ckl:cping operations which 
was affirmatively defined by President Bush and redetined by ' President 
Clinton, which renects the vacilla tions in Americao fmcibrn pnli<.-y. AJso, 
mu t UN operations are based on the intelligence dAta which are passed 
on tO them by the great power:., which increases the need for an inde-
pendent l JN suurce of inte lligence data. 
The readiness which Clrnton demonstrated a t the G7 meeting in Tokyo 
about American panicipation in the formation of permanent U R apid 
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Reaction Fnrce is <~ proof that America is ready for a multilateral action 
but only if it retains great autonomy of political action and command. 
And vice versa: the main reason for the /\me1ican hesitation to join 
the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the manner 
in which Europeans have attempted to resolve the Bosnian crisis: breaking 
up Bosnia ami kowtowing tn Lht: a~ressnr insteau of saving this multi-
ethnic state and defending its borders. AJready in Somalia and the former 
Yugoslavia Americans were ready for some give-and-take. 1n fact, the 
American (allied) camp:-1i::,rn in Kuwait raiseu (false) hopes that that op-
eration, by which the sovereignty of a UN member had been defended, 
wnuh.l serve as a model for solving future conflicts. It was forgotten that 
Lhe coalition's action had been motivated by oil and not by the desire to 
safeguard international Jaw, that the campaign had been approved and 
even suppor1ed hy the desintcgrating Soviet Union ami that the campaign 
bad secured and enjoyed the support of the great majority of Muslim and 
nonaligned countries. Likewise, /\mericru1 intervention in Hait~ in "the 
American b<1cky<1rd", w<~s primarily motivated by the refugee crisis. 
ln Croatia and Bosnia, 1\rnerica unambiguously opted for detening the 
Scrhian ag!:,rrcssion on these two slates, but becau,o;;e of the Viclmtm syn-
drome they were more inclined to leave to the divide.d Burope;m powers 
to solve the crisis. On the one hand, the policy of Great Britain <Uld 
France was to prevent the complete defeat of Serbia and tbe creation of 
a strong Croatia. They believed that this would ward off the awakened 
German self-confidence in Europe. This, naturally, thwarted any resolute 
joint action which would clearly send a message to Belgrade and bring 
about at least the balance of power. The danger threatening the de-
ployed French and the Briti:-;h tmups Nerved only as »n excuse for pussy-
footing. The reason that rhe troops from these countries were most nu-
merous was to cause such a paralysis and to manipulate with the infor-
mation. 
The question is whether Washington opposed the miscellany of Euro-
pean plans for the solution of the war in Bosnia because it was against 
lhc violation uf principles and the creation of potential.ly explosive prece-
dents (the territorial integrity of tbe victim of the aggression, obstructing 
the concessions to the aggressor, punishing war crimes, preventing banish-
ment, etc.) or because it did not want to intervene militari1y (particularly 
with its ground troops) in the implementation of any peace plan, in a 
regional crL-;is which i$ not American national priority and which could 
create a precedent for similar unc.al.led-for American engagement in other 
regions. Probably it was a c.ombination of the Lwn, plus the cumplex and 
multifarious relations of the USA with individual European partners and 
Russia. 
lt has also been proved that the decision about sending American 
troops ns part of the peacekeeping operations in the post-Yugoslav conflict 
to a large exte nt depended on the fruslraling experience uf the action of 
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e lite American troops against several hundred guerrilla fighters of General 
Aidid, but also on the ovcr;Lrc tchcu America who ttt the same time had 
to play the centraJ ro le in the peace process in the MiddJe East, in the 
stabiJization of Russia, in the disarmament of Lhc nc\\ly c..Tcatcu nucle<tr 
power- anti in Lhc prevention uf the emergence of the new ones, and in 
the redefinition of lhe '/\TO defense strategy. 
Fo llowing the negative American experience in Somalia, the first phase 
of the ir campaign in Haiti and the frustra tions to whtch the peacekeeping 
force have been subjected in Bol-lnia-Hcrccgovina and Croatia, the Ameri-
can government, pressured by the Congress and the public, gave up on 
Clinton's pre-electoral support for tJ1e creation of UN Rapid Reaction 
Fnrcc anti pmposctl toughe r crite ria for sending American troops as part 
of the UN peacekeeping opera tions. ln late Janua ry of t9n, after several 
months, the government cnmplctcu iL'> work on establishing ;1 minimum of 
t:rit cria for Amerie<~n participation in such operations (known as the Pres i-
dentia l directive) which should serve as the "navigational nn1p" in uecit.ling 
abou l American parLicipaLion in p~.:acckceping ope rat ions on a case-to-case 
ha ·is. 
These criteria require convincing proofs that intcmational security bas 
been jcnpan.lizcd, Lhal a bim,rer <:<ttastropbe is looming which requires an 
urgent action or that the re have been major abuses of human rights. 
America a lso requires other countries to !.how rcatlinc. l-1 to participate in 
an operation. In most case~ American troops will remain under J\merican 
command. The big,oer and the more complex a peacekeeping operation, 
lhe less chonces for American tmnpl-1 tn take p:ut in it under rhe UN 
commumL Tite formulation of these criteria was preceded by vicious bick-
enng between lhe Pentagon and the State Departmc..:nt about wh.icb de-
partment i. w fooL the hi ll for the American participation in lhe UN 
peacekeeping missions. lt has been agreed tha t ilie State D cparlmcnl is 
responsible for funding the traujtional peace mediation wh.iJe Pentagon is 
to finam."C o ffcn!.ivc military Hction such as the one in Somalia. 
The overaU US policy regarding peacekeeping opcratious is to take into 
constderation the role of regioual nrga.nizations :t · we ll as a more efficient 
managcml!nl of the resources allocated for peacekeeping operations. 
When republicans obtained majority i11 Cnnbrrc~s. this meant a new 
nightmare fo r peatx:kccping ope ra tions because republica ns used Bosnia 
and some other weaknesses ill C linton's administration's polk:y as well as 
American contribution to the UN hudge t as a pre text for discrediting 
Clinton. 
First, on 16 February, 1995, the Hnu.sc of R epresentatives pushed the 
biiJ which forbids cxtcnsivc tl'>C of American intelligence and o ther infra-
l> lructurc facilities for peacekeeping operations (naval hlocknue.", patrol ling 
the no-fly zones, e tc.) worth 1.2 billion dollars unless they are included in 
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the co t of American <.'Onlrihutiun anti unle.~" they an~ authc.1rized by both 
houses of Congress. 
Nter that. the arne C'urlb'TC. )\iunal hnuo;e pa ·ed the bill ( H.R.7) which 
would o;la h direct American funding for the UN peacekeeping operations 
(1.7 bilhon doUars in 1995), from a 31.7% to _oc:;; 'hare. Ms Albright 
l><titl thiJ. rcprcscntctl the ono;ct nf •·chaos" and .. budgetary anarchy'' in the 
U ince this example might be followed by other countries, for example 
France tn Ruanda and Japan in SornaJia. US ScLTCiotrics uf Defense and 
Stale atlvisctl President Clinton to use vero if the bill is passed in the 
Senate smce it would tie President's hands in case hc wanted to :;end 
American troop!> ahmad and would bring to a bah many existing 
peacekeeping operations. 
Great powers have bet:ll iucn:asingly using the pretext of the "will of 
the inlcmatinnal community", hoth to " legalize' ' their unilateral or alleg-
edly multilateral campaign or to cut the costs and risks uf intervening in 
a crisis. 
The preventive or punitive interventionism has become par·ticularly un-
acceptable in disintegrating state., iu case.-; of intern<ll turmoils o r re-
gional irnpcrialiJ.m, which i" the most frequent form of post-coldwar re-
gion<ll in-;t;~biliry. Convinced that it bas no mandate LO ucal with the 
causes of civil wars, disintegration of sta te. , foreign inte rve ntions and hu-
manitariftn cat.a.-;truphcs, the international community has been predomi-
nantly oriented towards their consequences. 
Particularly compleA t.Ti\cl-. nf uur time, in which internal conflicts go 
hand in hand \\ith forergn .tg_eression, humanitarian disas ters and \\ith 
genocides, and which an: resolved by mcaiL\ of the traditional mandate of 
peaet: mediation, ha\'c mad!! a dent in the credibility of the United Na-
tions and regional o rganizations. 
Mediators are vel) often di,inte rested observers of the genocide who 
tlo nut think the ir rask is to protect human rights or to <.·oupcnue with 
tho e who collect data about that. Humanitarian uid thar saves some 
people, prolongs the agony of others because it stands in the way of a 
more energetic stance towards dealing with the causes of a tragedy. The 
moral bankruptcy of peacekeeping operatinns L'-<lnnot be avoided without a 
serious reconsLruction of pcacemaking which, in turn, cannot be done out-
sidc the.: context of this still unre formed work! organization. The United 
Nations are exactly as their nu::rnh~;r countries want the m to be or as 
they deserve to he. 
Today the UN cannot afford ncw failures if they want to maintain 
credibility. Great powl.!rJ. C<Jnnot any longer bide behind the Security 
Council and point their finger at the UN SecretariaL, nor c<tn the Secre-
tariat keep handing over hut potatoes to Lhe Security Council's permanent 
members. 
lOt 
The United Nations, and particuhtrly tht:ir peacekeeping npcratioos, 
tbough reinvigorated, havt: not undergone a thorough reform which would 
qualify Lhem for efficacious solutions of more complex regional and inter-
nal crises. Nor is it likely that this will happtm soon or proceed smnuthly. 
Tite UN peacekeeping force. are, with their compul>i tion, logistics, equip-
ment and mandate, most suitable for enforcing peace. The~ "houltl not be 
used in combination with humanitanan activili~:" which should be e\clu-
sively left over to humanitarian organizations. lf there is a need for inter-
ventionism, enforcing peace or punishing aggressors, these tasks can only 
be undenaken by great powers or strong regional milita ry organizations 
responsible for regional collective sccurity. The role of the UN 
pcacekecping forces is Lu stabilize the postconflicl situation, to aid postwar 
recon'\1 ruction, to build up mutual confidence and reg:ionHI stability, or to 
establish order after the milital)' situation ha. been stabilized in t1 country 
in which the UN protector.Hc bas been accepted a' a temporary measure 
due to <1 collapse of the government. 
Only in the fK''I L·old war age the conctitinn)o, are ripe tor a thorough 
rccoustruction of peacekeeping operations more oriented towards the pre-
vention of contlicts, creation and enforcing peace. ln the beginning those 
activities were halfway between the Vl and the Vll chapter of the UN 
Chart~r ("Chapter 6.5"). lnl crnalioual legal and politie<~l comlitions have 
been crea ted for the interveotionjsm of lhc international community in in-
ternal affairs of o the r countries not solely when a complete paralysis of 
state in~titutions occurs, but ai<;O in the case of humanitarian tragedies. 
ecological disa!.tcr... war crimes. and human right' abuse. 
All this will leave a permanent trace on the reform uf the UN 
peacekeeping upe;:rations which envisages a more marked peace-enforcing 
operatio nal role for re&rinnal organizations as well as thc formation and 
tn1ining of national contingents for future peacekeeping operations. Tbe 
system of stales and their inviolable soverei!:,rnly will remain the axis of 
the international system, hut the untouchable state sovl!rcignty bas been 
significantJy undermined by the right of the international community to in-
tervene in internal affairs especially when it reg-.m.b them as a threat tq 
regional or international 'ccurity, human rights and demu<.:racy. ecology 
and development. 
Lacking a willingness for a fuJI-sc~le military intervention of the Uulf 
type, the need for a more effic:ient use and coordination of other mt:ans 
of pressure arose, such as diplomaric isolation, sanctions and dictating the 
conditions for negotiations in order to get to the root of Lite conflict, i.e. 
the govemmeors and the leaders whn bad instigated the conflict in tJ1e 
first place. 
The Security Council am nut rely solely or exclusively on the we of 
force, but must comhine it with sanctions, disarmament. and arms contru\, 
cJjplomatic isolation, and other prcssures. 
Nobila lot , ~ ~m and~ Polol.. .-.Vol lOOCJ. 11995), No.:.. po. 66--102 102 
The new system of oollcctive security also requires that certain threats 
to internatioual peace and secUiity are taken into consideration: pL!accfnl 
transformation of postcommunisL societies, internal and in LL!rnationa l stabili-
zation of the newly t:reated states, curbing n:gional hegemonisms, reduciug 
poverty, reducing population growth, preventing environmental degradation 
and abuse of human and minority rights. 
TransJated by 
Hoiica Jakovlc:v 
